Sunni Ideology, Contention and the Islamic State in Iraq by Merone, Fabio





PArtecipazione e COnflitto 
http://siba-ese.unisalento.it/index.php/paco 
ISSN: 1972-7623 (print version)    
ISSN: 2035-6609 (electronic version) 
PACO, Issue 14(2) 2021: 727-742 
       DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v14i2p727 
 








SUNNI IDEOLOGY, CONTENTION AND THE ISLAMIC STATE IN 
IRAQ1 
 
Fabio Merone  
Centre Interdisciplinaire de Recherche sur l’Afrique et le Moyen Orient, Université Laval 
 
 
ABSTRACT: This article discusses the emergence, development and trajectory of ISIS in Iraq 
through the lenses of Social Movement Theory. It deploys the political process model and outlines 
both structural and agency factors. The article argues that the Sunni regions of Iraq developed a 
separate political community after 2003, against the backdrop of the sectarian politics that the 
coalition of Shia parties that supported the al-Maliki government in Baghdad were perceived to be 
pursuing. The political process unfolded in three phases from 2003 to 2014. While Sunni political 
parties tried to compromise with the al-Maliki government in 2010, the latter’s uncompromising 
stance created the context for more radical forces to come on the scene. In 2013, Baathists and 
Salafi-jihadists formed a revolutionary front, which led to a generalised uprising in the Sunni 
regions of the country. The article explains how ISIS was able to take advantage of the political 
opportunities on the ground and provides analytical insights for its transformation from an isolated 
organisation to a hegemonic revolutionary force.    
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1. Introduction  
 
On 29 June 2104, after seizing Mosul, the largest city of northern Iraq, the Salafi-Jihadi 
organisation called the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS) announced the establishment of an 
Islamic state (or Caliphate), claiming authority over a territory larger than the United Kingdom’s 
(Kaválek 2015: 2). This event sparked both concern and interest, especially because the declaration 
of a new state appeared to be more than the ephemeral action of armed fanatics. The Salafi-Jihadi 
group at the head of this project – simply known as Islamic State (IS hereafter) after the declaration 
of the state2 – was not only an armed group, but had an ideology and a political programme that 
offered the Sunni Arab population of Iraq3 an alternative solution to Baghdad’s state-building 
project.  
Although in July 2017 the Sunni regions of Iraq returned under the formal authority of Baghdad, 
the question of the integration of the Sunni community into the post-2003 institutional setting 
remains open (Plebani 2017). After the fall of the Baath regime, Iraq, under US influence, saw the 
establishment of a national pact based on the division of the country into three political 
communities, a pact that the Sunnis initially refused (Dawisha and Diamond 2006: 93-94). Iraqi 
Sunnis were traditionally attached to a nationalist vision of Iraq based on pan-Arabism and were 
sceptical of the new national project Kurds and Shias subscribed to after 2003. With time, this 
particular nationalist political strand evolved into what can be labelled a proper “Sunni ideology”. 
Because it was based on a national vision the other confessional communities in the country did not 
share, it became a type of nationalism that claimed to be “Iraqi”, despite being almost exclusively 
“Sunni”. In particular, it developed as an ideology that combined traditional Baath nationalism and 
Islamism with strong Salafi features, which I label in this article “Islamo-nationalism”.  
This combination shaped the ideological frame for the conflict between the Sunnis (considered 
as a political community) on one side and the Kurds and Shias on the other. As mentioned, the 
latter wanted to leave traditional Iraqi nationalism behind and they perceived “Sunni ideology” as 
the result of frustration for those who had held almost exclusive political power under the previous 
regime. In practical political terms and thanks to the communitarian divisions of power post-2003, 
the Kurds solidified their right to self-government within an autonomous territory, while Shia 
political parties took control of the central government in Baghdad. This was indeed a complete 
reversal of the balance of power that had existed under Saddam Hussein and it led to the clash 
between confessional communities.4   
The Sunni community’s exclusion from power created the conditions for a section of the Sunni 
population to imagine a separate state as an alternative political option to the sectarian division of 
power. For this to happen in practice, however, Sunni political actors had to be confronted, first, 
with the impossibility of integrating Iraqi political institutions and, second, with the emergence of a 
political actor proposing a coherent program of state-building and able to become sufficiently 
hegemonic to offer precisely such an alternative. Neither the existence of a separate Sunni ideology 
nor the existence of ISIS as a social and political actor are per se factors that can explain the 
achievement of a separate project of state-building. The political process that unfolded between 
2003 and 2014 shows, on the contrary, that at specific junctures the integration of the Sunni parties 
into the new national project was a possibility and that ISIS was isolated, with many Sunnis 
 
2 The group was called in different ways since its inception in 2004 when it appeared as Jamaa Tawhid wa Jihad 
(JTWJ). In this article, I will use the name corresponding to the different stages of development of the group.  
3 Sunni Muslims are the majority within the Kurdish population, but this group mostly identifies along ethnic lines. 
Thus, I use the label “Sunni” to refer to the Arab Sunnis of Iraq, and “Kurds” for the Kurds – be they Sunni or 
Shia. 
4 For a discussion of the analytical categories of “confessional”, “sectarian” and “communal” see Haddad’s (2011) 
excellent book. 






actually fighting against it. Between Sunni inclusion into the post-2003 institutions and ISIS 
popularity among the Sunni population, there is in fact an inversely proportional relation. During 
the different phases of the political process, ISIS went through periods of strategic revision and 
learned from its defeats that it had to adapt to the local context if it wanted to make its plan 
convincing and acceptable.  
This article challenges received wisdoms about ISIS and looks at it as a social movement to be 
understood within its context. A considerable amount of literature – more policy-oriented and 
journalistic than academic – has been devoted to ISIS/IS and a gap in the understanding of the 
phenomenon still exists. Scholars and policy specialists have focused their attention on the global 
dimension of the phenomenon (Gerges 2017; Bishara 2018; Abu Haniyya 2018), examining it 
through theories of terrorist studies and political violence (Byman 2015; Stern and Berger 2015; 
McCants 2015) or insurgency (Whiteside 2016; Ryan 2015; Kalyvas 2015). Although some authors 
discussed the influence of the Iraqi context (Weiss and Hassan 2016; Benraad 2015; Brown 2015; 
Cockburn 2015; Hashim 2014), there is no in-depth study about the relation between the movement 
and the Sunni Iraqi context, as if ISIS/IS were almost an alien phenomenon to the local Iraqi 
ideological environment. 
In order to bring this connection to the fore, it is necessary to understand ISIS/IS against the 
backdrop of the political process that unfolded in Iraq between 2003 and 2014, focusing in 
particular on the development of ISIS/IS’s strategy of Iraqization and the development of a “Sunni 
ideology”. More specifically, this article examines the rise of ISIS/IS within the theoretical frame 
of the political process model borrowed from Social Movement Theory (SMT) and builds on it 
through a number of innovations. First, the concept of political process is employed more broadly 
that in traditional political opportunity structures and includes the ideological factor (Wiktorowicz 
2004:14), which, in this case, is what I call the “Sunni ideology”, i.e. a particular worldview 
developing in the Sunni political community as a reaction to Iraqi politics post-2003. Second, 
agency is also taken into account and, in particular, the focus is on ISIS/IS strategy of 
“Iraqization”, which is an organisational rational choice emerging from the experience of past 
defeats for the jihadi movement. The movement’s political document issued in 2010 is particularly 
significant in this respect, especially the section dealing with the movement’s relationship with 
local Sunni tribes (Strategic Plan 2010).5   
Finally, the way in which the communitarian categories – Sunni, Shias and Kurds – are used in 
this article should be clarified. While the existence of communitarian politics is the reality of the 
politics of the country after 2003, a too narrow definition of communitarian categories as the 
primer identifier of the individual political behaviour may be problematic. This is why they are 
here used as categories similar to the Weberian ideal-types, to be considered as epistemological 
generalisations.  
 
2. The political process and Sunni ideology  
 
The dynamics of the political events occurring between 2003 and 2014 are significant for the 
understanding of the way in which the identity and ideology of the Sunni community of Iraq were 
shaped, and how this ultimately affected the rise and success of ISIS. This general timeframe can 
be sub-divided into three phases, each exhibiting a specific attitude of the Sunni community 
 
5 In 2010, ISI produced a booklet outlining their strategic plan for the new phase. The full title of the book is: 
Khoutah Istratijiya li Ta'aziz al-Moqif al-Siyasi al-Dawlat al-Islamyiah fi al-Iraq (A Strategic Plan to Improve the 
Political Position of the Islamic State of Iraq). Since the plan does not have an author, I simply quote it as 
“strategic plan”. The quote is based on the Arabic version available at: 
https://ketabonline.com/en/books/17969/read?page=1&part=1. The translation in English is by the author. 
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towards the broader Iraqi environment. The first phase (2003-2005) is characterised by a military 
insurgency against the American occupation – the first insurgency – whereby the Sunnis clearly 
rejected the post-2003 political order. The second phase (2006-2010) is characterised by a complete 
reversal of the situation, whereby the majority of the insurgency groups active during the first 
phase allied with the central government and the US against the Salafi-Jihadis groups. In this 
second phase, Sunni political parties participated in elections and endeavoured to join state 
institutions – the phase of integration. The third phase is characterised by a second armed 
insurgency (the second insurgency) that followed a popular civilian campaign – referred to as 
revolution by the protagonists – against the sectarianism of the Al-Maliki government. This third 
phase ended with ISIS/IS declaration of the Caliphate in June 2014. 
The political process model, as used in SMT theory, determines the causal structural factors 
behind the actions of political and social actors. It creates in fact political opportunities or 
constraints with respect to which a Social Movement Organisation (SMO) makes its strategic 
choices. This article however expands on the concept of political process to include the formation 
of a Sunni ideology as part of those structural factors that have an impact on the practical framing 
of the actors’ agency and finally on the outcome of the political process itself. In other words, 
while the political junctures explain how and why a certain strategy is successful, they say nothing 
as to why that particular option (in our case the Islamist/Salafist one) becomes credible and 
accepted.  
The article first outlines the political process, relating it to the dynamics of inclusion/exclusion 
of Sunni political actors. Second, it emphasises political (Sunni) community-building as a response 
and a reaction to it. Those two factors together – inclusion/exclusion and Sunni community-
building – determine the framing of a particular ideological view: the Sunni ideology. Those two 
factors represent the background of ISIS political action and strategy. 
 
2.1 The post-2003 political process 
 
The first phase of the political process began with the overthrow of the Baath regime and the 
Bush administration’s establishment of a roadmap for a political transition to democracy. The 
American governor Paul Bremer was selected head of the Coalition Provisional Authority’ (CPA) 
on May 2003. In July of the same year, Bremer appointed a 25-member interim advisory body - the 
Iraq Governing Council (IGC) – chosen according to a system of communal representation 
(muhasasa) (Katzman and Humud 2015: 2). In January 2005, elections for a constitutional 
assembly were held and a new interim body was elected. During the same year, a new constitution 
was drafted and approved by referendum in October, followed by new legislative elections held in 
December. While this process was meant to be inclusive, the opposite occurred, as Sunni political 
organisations largely refused to join the process, which they considered illegitimate. To them, the 
country was in a state of military occupation, with the consequence that it was the duty of all the 
Iraqis to resist it (Pfiffner 2010: 76). From the Sunni point of view, the withdrawal of the American 
forces was the prerequisite for any political process to start. The consequence was that many 
Sunnis engaged in open armed resistance while the Shia (with the initial exception of the 
movement linked to the cleric Moqtada Al-Sadr) and Kurds backed the American sponsored 
political process.6 Sunni rejection of post-invasion institutional arrangements was manifest during 
the 2005 provincial elections and constitutional referendum. First Sunnis largely boycotted the 
 
6 In this first phase, the Shia political community’s attitude towards the American occupation varied. The Sadr 
movement, in particular, engaged in an armed resistance against the American troops and also engaged into a battle 
against the Al-Maliki government between 2006 and 2008. There were also attempts of convergence between the 
Sunni resistance and the Sadrist movement. It eventually failed after the first Sunni sectarian attacks on Shia 
shrines in 2006.   






elections (International Crisis Group 2013: 8) and then they participated in the referendum with the 
objective of defeating the provisions of the new constitution. All the Sunni majority-regions did 
indeed vote against the constitution, with the highest percentage of no vote in the Anbar province, 
the epicentre of the resistance (Al-Qarawee 2014). 
The situation began to change by the end of 2005. First, the position of radical refusal of the 
political process proved difficult to hold on the long term and, second, nationalist Iraqi groups 
clashed with the radical jihadist organization Jamaa Al-Tawhid wa Al-Jihad (JTWJ) and Al-Qaeda 
in Iraq (AQI), headed by Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi. The Jordanian jihadi leader, who had trained 
with Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, came to Iraq to pursue the international jihad against the Americans. 
While he was accepted as part of an Islamist international network, mobilised in defence of Muslim 
lands during the first months of the resistance, his extremist actions and ideas ended up alienating 
most of the local Iraqi insurgent factions. Eventually, Sunni political parties ended the insurgency 
against the state and joined the political process. The legislative elections at the end of 2005 
triggered a new political phase and by the beginning of 2006, Iraq was set on a course based on a 
new constitution and democratic representative institutions with the participation of all 
communities. 
The second phase was characterised by the Sunni political parties’ endeavour to join the political 
process and the attempts of these social and political forces to bargain for a share of power with the 
central government. A key indicator of how Sunnis changed their political behaviour was the 
abandonment of armed resistance on the part of most groups. In fact, they joined a coalition of 
tribal militia in the Sunni Awakening (Sahwa in Arabic) against AQI. This coalition saw the 
coming together of tribal groups, former resistance militias, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and 
even the Americans (Hussein 2007: 4). Another clear indication of this new Sunni integrationist 
attitude was the setting up of the inter-sectarian electoral list Al-Iraqiyya (headed by the Shia 
secular politician Ayad Allawi), which won the majority of votes in the 2010 legislative elections 
and was therefore expected to lead the government. Both the military alliance and the political 
participation in an inter-sectarian political initiative were evidence that the Sunnis could and 
wanted to integrate the political process if an opportunity for inclusion was given. The Sahwa 
coalition for example was based on the understanding that the Sunni insurgents and the tribal forces 
would be allowed to integrate the official military bodies of the state. Former army Baathists who 
wished to reintegrate their previous positions dominated the resistance groups (notably the “1920 
revolutionary brigades” and “the Islamic army”) and they expected to reach an agreement with the 
central authorities on this point after having fought against AQI. For its part, Al-Iraqiyya was 
expected to be very influential in parliament and its electoral success should have led it to form a 
government, providing the Sunni community with a degree of influence and creating therefore a 
communal balance of power. However, the Al-Maliki government failed to keep the promise of 
integrating the Sahwa forces into the regular SIF and, in addition, was also able to create a front of 
Shia parties that allowed him to keep power, notwithstanding his electoral defeat in favour of non-
sectarian Al-Iraqiyya (Wicken 2013: 6). Most of the Shia parties acted out of fear at the possibility 
of a Sunni-dominated government. This was evidence that, notwithstanding Al-Iraqiyya initiative, 
communal/sectarian dynamics still dominated Iraqi politics.  
The third phase of the political process began with the departure of the American troops in 2010-
20117 and the beginning of the Arab uprisings. The wave of contestation against the Assad regime 
in neighbouring Syria encouraged popular demonstrations against Al-Maliki’s rule, which was 
considered equally authoritarian and sectarian in the Iraqi Sunni heartlands (Brown 2015). The 
response of the central government was violent and uncompromising and the lack of solidarity of 
the Shia population rendered the confrontation a conflict between the Sunnis on one side and a 
 
7 The withdrawal of the American troops from Iraq was completed on 18 December 2011. 
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Shia-biased central government on the other (International Crisis Group 2013). The ideological 
harsh attitude and predatory behaviour of Shia militias towards the Sunni population increased the 
latter’s feeling of frustration, which was compounded by Al-Maliki’s continuous refusal to fulfil 
the promises of integrating the Sahwa fighters and former Baathists into the official armed forces 
(Al-Qarawee 2014). Al-Maliki continued to pursue a policy of quasi-personal power and kept 
control of the three security cabinets (Katzman and Humud 2015: 20). Moreover, he used the 
Justice and Transitional Commission to punish his political rivals, almost all of them Sunni 
politicians. This triggered a cycle of Sunni protests and government’s crackdowns, peaking in 2013 
with a general mobilisation in Sunni areas against the central authorities (Katzman and Humud 
2015: 21).8 These conflictual dynamics between the Sunnis and the central government increased 
sectarian tensions and finally led to the failure of Sunni integration into the post-2003 national pact. 
The non-violent campaigns for democratisation that unfolded between 2012 and 2013 remained 
limited to the Sunni areas of the country. The attitude of the Al-Maliki government of looking at 
any Sunni protest movement as the sign of the latter’s nostalgia for the former regime and/or as 
infiltrated by “terrorists” reflected the Shia and Kurdish widespread prejudice towards the Sunnis.9 
The outcome was, first, a generalised mobilisation in the Sunni areas of the country against the 
central government and, later, the successful ISIS campaign of declaration of the Caliphate.  
The division into three phases of the post-2003 political process shows the evolution and 
dynamics of Sunni politics. During the first phase, Sunni insurgent groups and parties consciously 
fought against the political process, while in the second phase there were evident signs of Sunni 
political parties’ willingness to find a compromise and integrate state institutions. The same was 
true for non-jihadist insurgents. The Al-Maliki government however was not keen to accept Sunni 
rapprochement and played the sectarian card to exclude Sunni concerns and demands.  
 
2.2 The Sunni community and the development of an “Islamo-nationalist” 
ideology 
 
The creation of different political communities according to an ethno-sectarian divide was the 
result of the national vision that prevailed after 2003 in occupied Iraq. This vision was based on the 
Kurdish and Shia narrative of persecution – a narrative that the American administration supported 
(Al-Qarawee 2014). While the Kurds were interested in a federal state project and therefore 
focused on governing their own autonomous territory, the Shia political parties aimed for control of 
the central government. This led to the setting up of a (non-official) confessional political system 
whereby political institutional positions were divided according to the demographic confessional 
balance.10  
While Sunnis political forces opposed in principle this process of communitarianisation, they 
developed their own communitarian identity in response to it. Sunni nationalists had no qualms in 
joining a common front of resistance with the Shia cleric Moqtada Al-Sadr during the first phase of 
the political process in the name of Iraqi nationalism, but the “salafisation” of the Sunni fight and 
the sectarian turn of Zarqawi-led “jihad”, which targeted Shia civilians and shrines, created a 
profound chasm between the two communities. Such chasm in turn contributed to the development 
 
8 The political instability following the Syrian civil war benefited the organisation of ISIS’s military campaign in 
2013. This article however does not deal with it in details because it focuses on ISIS/IS as an Iraqi local 
phenomenon, and it therefore focuses on ISIS/IS’ local environment.  
9 Interview with Ahmed and Borhan. 
10The President of the Republic is a Kurd, the Speaker of the Parliament a Sunni, the Prime Minister – the most 
influential institution – a Shia. Informally, Iraqi demographic estimates suggest that two-thirds of Iraqis are Shia 
and the rest are Sunni and other minorities. Ethnic Kurds are 4,700,000 out of 40,194,216 of the total population 
(European Parliamentary Research Service, 2015).  






of two opposite narratives regarding the past, present and future of Iraq. The Sunnis were not only 
seen as nostalgic for the old regime but also anti-democratic, because they appealed to the use of 
“terrorism and did not accept the political democratic game”.11 For its part, the Sunni narrative 
centred on the denunciation of sectarian and religious Shia groups’ occupation of state institutions, 
especially the security forces. Sunnis felt that in Baghdad power was in the hands of a “religious 
Shia state”.12 The domination of Shia parties in national politics created indeed a new context. They 
were not only traditionally well-organised, but most of them were also based on religious (or 
radical communitarian) ideologies.13 This created the perception among the Sunnis of a “shiization” 
of the country.14 
Against this backdrop, whereby the country was divided in communities and the central 
government dominated by Shia parties, the feeling of “Iraqeness” was weakened. Moreover, the 
Sunni community’s relation to power saw a dramatic shift. From being the proud holders of Iraqi 
nationalism – based on the Baathist, pan-Arabist ideology of the former regime – the community 
was reduced to the status of minority. In response to this new situation, the sentiment of being a 
separate Sunni community grew and a specific Sunni ideology came to characterise the political 
view of many of them. This was based on a mix of traditional Arab nationalism and Sunni religious 
awakening: “Islamo-nationalism”. 
In its early days, Islamo-nationalism had been the creation of Saddam Hussein’s propaganda. 
Saddam faced a loss of legitimacy after the Kurdish and Shia uprisings that followed the first Gulf 
War of 1991 and Islamo-nationalism consisted in transforming the definition of the nation (Iraq) 
into religious (Sunni) terms (Rabkin 2018). While Baath nationalism was originally secular and 
centred on ethno-pan-Arabism, this changed in the 1990s and became religious (Sunni)-sectarian. 
In the early 1990s, the regime’s official ideology began to emphasise Islamic references.15 Most 
importantly, it began a religious campaign called the faith campaign Hamlah Al-Imaniyya headed 
by Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, vicepresident and deputy chairman of the Revolutionary Command 
Council and later on key figure in the Baathists’ resistance organisations (Fink and Leibowitz, 
2006: 2-3).  
While at this time Islamo-nationalism was more a sentiment the regime attempted to instil to 
widen its popularity and legitimacy than a clear-cut ideological programme, in the post-2003 Iraq it 
became the ideological weapon of the Sunni resistance against the occupation first and the response 
to the Shia sectarianisation of politics later. This ideology came to reflect the feeling of frustration 
of the Sunni population and defined the ideological framework of its identity as political 
community. Two ideological trends – nationalism and Islamism/Salafism – converged to 
substantiate such an ideology. In spite of the apparent contradiction in this merging, it came to form 
an ideological worldview opposed to the Kurdish and Shia communities. 
Two important political personalities of the Sunni resistance well represent the connection 
between the two souls of this ideology: Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri and Harith al-Dhari. The former was 
not only, as mentioned, the head of the faith campaign during the Saddam Hussein regime, but also 
a central figure of the “Islamist trend” within the Baath party. The latter was a Muslim cleric at the 
 
11 Interview with Ahmed. 
12 Interview with Khalaf. 
13 Traditional Shia parties are the Dawa Party and the ISCI (Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq) historically known 
as SCIRI (Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution of Iraq). 
14 The Sunni inhabitants of Baghdad (Arabs or Kurds) accuse the Shia militias to aim at turning Baghdad into a 
“Shia city”, by pushing Sunni inhabitants out. Reports by witnesses on this are numerous; I have talked to several 
witnesses during my field visit in Iraq in 2019 who confirmed this narrative. For further details, see also the 2013 
International Crisis Group report. 
15 Example of this was the introduction in the national flag of the religious logo “allah wa akhbar”.  
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Faculty of Arab Literature in Baghdad during the faith campaign. After 2003, al-Duri became the 
charismatic leader of the former Baathists and al-Dhari the most outspoken voice of the resistance, 
playing the role of coordinator between Salafists and Baathists. Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri was the key 
figure of Islamo-nationalism; two of the most important resistance groups in the Anbar province – 
the “1920 revolutionary brigades” and “the Islamic army”, as mentioned (formed in majority by 
former Baathists) – respected his leadership. He would become an even more important figure 
during the third phase of the political process when he led the Naqbashandi sufi organisation and 
coordinated joint-actions with ISIS during the occupation of Mosul, as we will see later. The cleric 
Harith al-Dhari was instead the most charismatic leader in the Muslim Scholars Association (MSA) 
and as such the symbol of the religious trend of the Islamo-nationalist resistance (Rabkin 2018).  
The development of a Sunni community with a separate identity and featuring an Islamo-
nationalist ideology should not lead us to consider however the creation of a separate Sunni state, 
as proposed by ISIS, as an inevitable outcome. The two major political forces representing this 
trend, the Islamic Iraqi party (IIP) and the MSA, adopted changing positions over time with regard 
to the integration in Iraqi political institutions (Fuller 2003: 8). The first sponsored the concord 
front (Jabahat Al-Tawafuq), a coalition that included secular nationalists, former Baathists, tribal 
sheikh leaders and various personalities that stood against the sectarian/communal institutional 
model through the legislative elections of 2005 (Al-Qarawee,2014). The second – a gathering of 
Salafists, Salafi-jihadists and former Baath party members – easily integrated the electoral process 
once the armed resistance ended (Meijer 2005). While the IIP seems to have had a more 
integrationist attitude and the latter a more rejectionist one, much of the evolution in one direction 
or the other depended on the evolution of the political process. 
 
3. ISIS’s “Iraqization” strategy between constraints and opportunities  
 
The political process evolved eventually in such a way that Sunni political organisations and the 
Sunni population more generally despaired of integrating the political institutions in Baghdad. 
Moreover, the sectarian Shia policy pursued by the central government, particularly emphatic under 
the Al-Maliki premiership, made “Islamo-nationalism” a proper ideology for an alternative state-
building solution. However, such a context created necessary but not sufficient conditions. In order 
for the political process to “reward” ISIS, it was still necessary for the group to have a viable 
strategy adapted to the context and able to take advantage of the 2013 favourable political juncture. 
In this section, the article examines the way in which the jihadi organisation changed in the midst 
of the political process, evolving from being a foreign body to become integrated into the Iraqi 
social context; from having a program of Islamic state-building largely rejected by Iraqi-nationalist 
factions to absorb nationalism into its Salafist strategy.   
 
3.1 The “Iraqization” of ISIS between governance and popular support  
 
The first phase of the jihad in Iraq, roughly corresponding to the first phase of the political 
process as described above, was contradictory. In the beginning, it was the work of a small group 
of foreign mujahedeen (fighters), mostly coming from outside the country, who gathered around 
the charismatic figure of Zarqawi. He came to Iraq leading the JTWJ and joined the fight in Falluja 
in 2003 and 2004.16 This group initially seemed similar to other mujahedeen Iraqi resistance 
groups, which used both jihadi and nationalist slogans (Acun 2014: 6). The homegrown 
organisations born out of the resistance against the American occupation tended however to be 
Iraqi nationalists (mostly former Army members) and opposed the separation of the country into 
regional entities, which they saw as part of an international conspiracy to divide the Arab umma 
 
16 JTWJ was founded in Jordan in 1999 and integrated into the Iraqi insurgency in 2003. 






(Al-Qarawee 2010). The JTWJ, which had become in 2004 the Al-Qaeda Iraqi local branch, AQI,17 
was interested in the governance of the territories under its control and it did indeed start 
implementing a separate strategic plan of action directed towards the creation of a revolutionary 
front whose aim was the creation of a new state ideologically shaped by the Salafi version of Islam. 
In this respect they were not necessarily interested in Iraqi territorial unity. AQI was producing a 
shift in the strategy of the resistance because it was not interested in integrating the Iraqi 
institutions and because it acted in an exclusivist manner in that it forcibly imposed its rule on the 
local tribes, refusing to share power with the other insurgency groups. The jihadi strategy was also 
criticised for the excessive use of violence, specifically against the Army and security forces 
recruiters and Shia civilians (Hafez 2007).  
Between 2005 and 2006 the political juncture changed (phase II) and the Iraqi Sunni groups of 
the insurgency progressively turned their back to the jihadis, who became a completely separate 
faction. This encouraged the latter to advance their strategy more clearly and “present themselves 
as an alternative to the existing Sunni leadership in Iraq” (Al-Sishani, 2014). In January 2006, the 
movement organised a Mujahedeen Shura Council (MSC) in the form of a coalition of Salafi-Jihadi 
forces (Lister 2014). This initiative was looked at with suspicion by many resistance groups; more 
so after the transformation of the MSC into the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). The establishment of ISI 
on 15 October 2006 proved indeed premature and found the opposition of most of the Sunni 
population that stood behind the Sahwa movement (Lister 2014).  
The period between 2006 and 2009 was a near-total defeat for the jihadi political strategy and it 
corresponded to the highest point of Sunni parties’ integrationist strategy, which led to the electoral 
experience of the Al-Iraqiyya list in 2010, as previously outlined. The importance of this political 
juncture is in that it shows that the Sunni population was not necessarily against the integration in 
the new Iraqi institutions. The organisation of the Awakening Councils was moreover evidence that 
Sunni society was trying to negotiate a new social contract with Baghdad (Alaaldin 2018:15-16). 
While tribal groups did throughout Iraqi history always act in opportunistic fashion, in the sense 
that they traditionally tried to bargain with the central government (McCallister 2005), the 
participation in those councils of most of the groups that had initially joined the resistance against 
the Americans was a blow for the jihadi strategy. Key was the role of the former Baathists who 
now supported the Al-Iraqiyya list because they trusted the chance to be reintegrated into the 
national armed forces and regain their job if the list performed well at the polls (Al-Qarawee 2014).    
 While the central government missed this important opportunity to integrate the Sunni 
community,18 ISI began revising its strategy and developed a new strategic plan (Strategic Plan, 
2010). Although AQI’s transformation in ISI after Al-Zarqawi’s death in 2006 did not lead 
necessarily to a decrease in the use of violence, the movement became more serious about building 
a social base of support. It did so through two strategies. First, it integrated more Iraqis into the 
organisation’s higher ranks (Iraqization). Second, it rooted its strategy into the local context, in 
particular by changing its attitude towards local tribes. As a consequence of the first decision, more 
Iraqi jihadi activists integrated the highest ranks of the organisations with a particular important 
presence of former Baathists (Cronin 2015: 4). The “Iraqization process” began right after Al-
Zarqawi’s death in June 2006. The Al-Qaeda Central (AQC)’s delegate in Iraq, Abu Hamza Al-
Muhajir, left Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi to hold the position of chief (amir) after the first Islamic 
State declaration on 15 October 2006. Ministers were appointed to form a ruling cabinet. While Al-
Muhajir kept for himself the strategic position of Minister of Aar (he shared the leadership with 
Omar Abu Bakr), all the other ministers were Iraqis (Abu Haniyya 2018). This process was 
 
17 The Arabic original name is Tandhim qaidat al-jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn, known in English simply as Al- Qaeda 
in Iraq (AQI).   
18 Interview with Plebani. 
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strengthened after 2010 with the integration of former Baathists in the military and security wings 
(Ibid.). In regard to the second decision, the Strategic Plan specifically pointed out the importance 
of developing a more inclusive policy towards tribal groups (Strategic Plan: 14). After 2010 and the 
appointment of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi as new leader, a new phase indeed began. According to Al-
Sishani (2014) “the group was shocked by the armed opposition of the Sunni Awakening Councils” 
and the plan drawn in the booklet is relevant to understand the strategy and tactics the movement 
used in the following stage of state building. The Strategic Plan is a booklet thought of as the 
movement’s political program for the new phase that followed the American withdrawal from Iraq. 
ISIS’s poor understanding of the social influence of tribes in the period between 2006 and 2009 
was perceived internally as the main cause of the group’s defeat. Although the book refuses to say 
so outright, it spends most of the introduction dealing with it, indirectly confirming the impression 
that this matter had become a central focus of concern within the jihadi movement (Strategic Plan: 
7, 12-13). Thus the plan calls for the participation of local tribes in the process of state building and 
shared governance to be realised through the establishment of “jihadi awakening councils” (Ibid.: 
37). 
The author of the Strategic Plan considers the tribal social system to be central in Iraq and argues 
that its co-optation would be the instrument through which the movement can gain a social base 
and obtain local support. The project of state building needs the people’s “approval and 
participation” in order to “achieve the loyalty and attachment of the public to the [Islamic] state and 
their association with it” (Ibidem: 38). Taking the social organisation of local tribes into 
consideration had the advantage of making governance more effective and consensual. Through the 
system of the councils, the people “will be part of the Islamic State through participating in the 
protection of their areas […], and thus the acceptance of the state and the integration of all the 
people will be greater and greater” (Strategic plan: 38), turning them into participants in the process 
of construction of the state. This system of governance makes people’s ideological adherence to the 
project of the Islamic state secure and provides a more effective military strategy (Ibid.: 39). To put 
it more explicitly, it is about “bringing society to the core of the Islamic state building process” 
(Ibidem: 38).  
 
3.2 The political juncture and the ISIS’ revolutionary strategy 
 
ISIS was able to learn from the failed experience of declaring a state in 2006 without having 
built a consistent political alliance with the other insurgency forces or a social base. Moreover, 
during that political juncture, the momentum was in favour of an integrationist strategy that most 
Sunni political forces followed. Baathists at the time were still hoping to be re-integrated into their 
former position as a reward of their support to the government’s security campaigns against ISI. 
The political juncture changed dramatically in the third phase (2011-2014) and ISIS was able to 
impose its plan of declaring an Islamic state. Both the abovementioned ISI/ISIS’s strategic changes 
and the political opportunities of the new phase determined this spectacular outcome.  
This political juncture is characterised itself by three stages. In the first, between 2011 and 2012, 
the protests in the Sunni region were dominated by mostly non-violent campaigns against al-
Maliki’s rule to which the prime minister reacted with a repressive attitude (Ottaway and Kaysi 
2011; Lovotti and Proserpio in this Special Issue). In the second period, during the year 2013, the 
“Sunni movement” became an insurgency and was led by the Naqbashandi, a group dominated by 
former Baathists strictly linked to a grassroots social and tribal network, especially strong in the 
provinces of Mosul, Tamim and the area around Tikrit. The third phase, starting in December 2013, 
lasted until the occupation of Mosul in June 2014 by the insurgency.  Hereby there saw the coming 
onto the scene of ISIS, which allied with the Naqbashandi to pursue the military operations that led 
the two groups, in a short time, to reach Mosul from the Anbar province. Finally, once in Mosul 
and with most of the Sunni regions under the control of the insurgency, a competition began 






between ISIS and the Naqbashandi for the rule of the territory. ISIS imposed itself as the strongest 
force on the scene and, after getting rid of its competitors, declared the Caliphate (Katzman and 
Humud 2015).    
In 2011, when a movement of non-violent protests against the al-Maliki’s rule became 
widespread in the Sunni regions of the county, ISIS was not yet an important political actor. In 
order for the latter to gain momentum, it was necessary for the political Sunni forces to realise that 
their previous strategy of inclusion had reached an impasse. Between 2011 and 2013 the political 
process escalated into an overt confrontation between Sunni organisations and the government 
(Katzman and Humud 2015). The key incidents that triggered the second insurgency occurred in 
the months of April and December 2013: the first in Hawaija (Tamim province) and the second in 
the city of Ramadi (Anbar province). On 23 April 2013, the ISF stormed a protest camp in the town 
of Hawaija, killing 40 civilians. This event was a watershed because it represented the moment 
when the Sunni protest movement changed into a militarised insurgency with the aim of 
overthrowing the government (Katzman and Humud 2015: 13). In December 2013, new protests 
occurred in the Anbar province with Ramadi as the epicentre. The Al-Maliki government 
overreacted once more and ordered the arrest of the Sunni protest leader and the MP Ahmad Al-
Alwani (Sowell 2014).19 Leaders of the Sunni insurgency proclaimed this insurgency as the 
“revolution” of the Sunni people against the Al-Maliki sectarian government. The scenario was 
similar to that of the first insurgency of 2003-2005 although this time the uprising was directed 
against Baghdad. Ali Hatem Al-Suleimani, the Chairman of the Military Council of Tribal 
Revolutionaries of Iraq (MCTRI) proclaimed: “the popular revolution will continue until the Nouri 
Al-Maliki government resigns and an interim government of independents are formed” (Acun 
2014: 7). Most of the Baathist militants returned to the battlefield while the tribes split again 
between those supporting the uprising and those favourable to the central government.20 As during 
the first insurgency, the population formed popular committees imbedded in local social networks 
and under a revolutionary platform. While not all the actors of the uprising had a radical solution to 
the crisis in mind, those organisations that took the lead of the movement advocated clearly the 
overthrow of the government.21 
At this particular juncture, Islamo-nationalism became the main ideological frame of the revolt 
and took on separatist features. Baathist Iraqi flags were shown on the street while ISIS gained 
 
19 This was just the last of a series of repressive measures against major Sunni leaders. On 12 December 2011, Al-
Maliki issued a warrant against Tarek Hashimi. The following year, on 18 December, he sent the police to the 
Finance Minister’s home (Rafi Al-Issawi). A firefight broke out between the latter’s bodyguards and the police 
agents. Although Al-Issawi escaped, 10 of his bodyguards were killed. Rafi Al-Issawi was a well-known Sunni 
leader from Anbar and he found refuge and solidarity among the tribes of the regions (Katzman and Humud 2015: 
21).  
20 Much has been written about the relations between the Dulaim confederation and ISIS. According to Khalaf, the 
confederation was split into two blocs: those in favour of ISIS and those supporting the government. There were 
indeed tribes opposed to the central government since 2003, because they belonged to the networks of power built 
by Saddam Hussein and were therefore marginalised after his fall. Tribes like Albu Ajeel and Albu Nasser and the 
Jubuor tribal confederation of the Saladin governorate gained considerable privileges in providing men for the 
security apparatus at the time of Saddam (Dawod, 2018). Most of the men of these tribes were de-mobilised with 
de-baathification laws (Abdulrazaq and Stansfield 2016: 5). Others joined between 2012 and 2015 (Dawod, 2018: 
28). In addition to these opposition tribes, many others previously belonging to the Awakening councils defected 
and joined those supporting ISIS in part because of disenchantment with the al-Maliki government and in part 
because of ISIS successful propaganda campaign.  
21 Among the Anbar insurgency, the Anbar Tribes Revolutionary Council (ATRC) was more inclined to defend the 
civil population against the Shia militias than to the overthrow of the government.     
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control of Ramadi and Falluja (the two towns symbolising Sunni resistance against the Americans) 
in January 2014 with the participation of jihadi militants, local tribal fighters and defectors from the 
Iraqi Army. The MCTRI, which included the Naqbashandi movement Jaysh Rijal al Tariqa al 
Naqshibandia (JRTN)22 and the former salafi-jihadi umbrella organisation Mujahideen Shura 
Council of Abdullah Al-Janabi, was the leader of the revolutionary front (Sowell 2014). Salafist 
and Baathist components were this time unified and enjoyed the considerable support of local tribal 
groups (Katzman and Humud 2015: 13-14).  
The visible presence on the ground of ideologically oriented Baathist forces gave the 
“revolution” a flavour of old nationalism. Baathism – understood as a diffuse Iraqi nationalist 
identity based on Arab-Sunnism – is still an important ideology and is represented by a connected 
network of people partly linked to former Baath party’s members.23 While it is impossible to 
establish their real weight, in regions like Kirkuk, Mosul and Salah al-Din, Baathism is imbedded 
in local social and tribal networks.24 After 2013, they formed a powerful core of the insurgency and 
fused with the Sufi group Naqbashandi, popular in the region of Mosul and Kirkuk (Home Office 
2016; Arango 2014). This type of Baathism was based on a form of Islamo-nationalism, in the 
sense that the Sunni nationalist sentiment was strong and it was not in contradiction with radical 
ideological Islamism or Salafism. The Salafist and nationalist frame of the uprising was therefore 
clear and particularly well represented by the leadership of Izzat al-Duri, the JRTN’s head. Most 
notably, Salafists and Baathists represented a unified revolutionary front at the 2013-2014 juncture. 
The situation had therefore dramatically changed when compared to the first insurgency. The jihadi 
forces had in 2006 split from the rest of the resistance front and formed a separate revolutionary 
front (the Mujaheedeen Council). The same forces that had opposed it, gathered together in the 
Military Council (MCIR). The novelty of this juncture was that most Sunni political forces were 
now sceptical of integrating state institutions. The political process had created the conditions for a 
revolutionary outcome, with ISIS playing a hegemonic role within a larger front. The last phase of 
the insurgency at the beginning of June proved ISIS revolutionary strength and skills as the most 
powerful of the insurgency forces and the only one with a coherent and clear plan of action. Backed 
by the Naqbashandi troops, it swiftly occupied most of Anbar and Ninawa and penetrated Mosul 
during a campaign that lasted less than 10 days (Arango 2014). The military success of the 
campaign determined the shift of the leadership within the revolutionary front, as ISIS pushed the 
Baathists in a second rank (Windrem 2014). It was not only victorious militarily but also 
ideologically and strategically. Ideologically ISIS had been able to absorb Islamo-nationalism and 
strategically it had a clear plan of action and a political objective, namely the declaration of an 
Islamic state. Paradoxically, this was in fact a more realistic option compared to the other Sunni 
political forces that wanted to overthrow the government in Baghdad. Such a revolutionary front 
could never legitimately take the power in Baghdad where the political and communitarian balance 
had changed since 2003. The creation of a new state on conquered lands seemed therefore a more 
attractive and feasible preposition.   
After the occupation of Mosul, a joint administration of the city was tested for a while. Several 
meetings were held among the different forces. Rumours of an internal struggle between Baathists 
 
22 It was an aggregation of 78 tribes and clans, in addition of thousands of militias. It was formed in December 
2013 as the armed wing of the “revolution”. This and the JRTN were in fact semi-official former Baathists forces 
(Acun, 2014: 7).  
23 Interview with Borhan. 
24 It is impossible to assess their real political weight, because the party is officially forbidden. Two of the people 
interviewed for this article (Khalaf and Borhan) hold contrasting views on the matter. According to the latter, Al-
Basra News (http://www.albasrah.net/) is the website of reference for those aiming at reviving Baathism.  






and ISIS circulated (Abdulrazaq and Stansfield 2016).25 ISIS had however gained consensus in 
Mosul that had discretely controlled in the years following the American withdrawal in 201126 and 
ISIS finally imposed its will and eliminated rival groups. On 29 June 2014, once it took complete 
control of the city, ISIS declared the establishment of a new state (Caliphate) becoming the Islamic 
State-embodied.  
ISIS had acted as a revolutionary vanguard organisation by first joining a revolutionary front 
with several other forces and then imposing on the latter its own political solution (Whiteside 
2016).27 Like “the Bolsheviks in Russia, the Communist Party in China, the Khmer Rouge in 
Cambodia, or Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and his followers in Iran” had already done in the last 





This article analysed the experience of a Salafi-jihadi organisation (JTWJ-ISI-ISIS-IS) that 
developed in Iraq between 2003 and 2014. ISIS has been identified as the most violent of the jihadi 
organisations and most of the literature has examined it through the lenses of guerrilla warfare, 
terrorism or apocalyptic Salafism (Barron and Maye 2017). ISIS has indeed represented for some 
time the most radical branch of the Salafi-jihadi movement. However, most academic studies have 
not sufficiently explored the “local” nature of the movement and its political strategic behaviour. 
Contrary to the dominant literature, this article focused on the political dynamics and mechanisms 
that created the conditions for ISIS to implement its political program. In so doing, it highlighted 
the importance of the context in determining the outcome of the organisation’s strategy.  
The activists’ mechanisms of contention and the political context are factors that Social 
Movement Theory has examined for decades and the purpose of this article was to apply them to 
the dynamics of contention ISIS was the protagonist of. In particular, the article used the political 
process model, following the tradition of SMT (McAdam, et al., 2004). The article thus shows how 
both structures (such as political opportunities) and the movement’s agency (strategic adaptation to 
the context) were crucial factors in explaining the movement’s mechanisms of political choices.  
While the application of SMTs to Arab societies and to Islamist and Salafist movements is not a 
novelty, there was no study looking at ISIS as a social movement. The aim of this study was 
therefore to contribute to both the literature on Salafism and SMT. By using the latter for the 
understanding of the specific case of ISIS, this article achieved a number of objectives. First, it 
highlighted the role the political process played in determining the development of a separate Sunni 
political community and the sectarianisation of Shia politics. Second, it emphasised the role “Sunni 
ideology” played in determining the relevance of the “Islamo-nationalist” option to solve the 
political impasse Sunnis found themselves confronted with. Third, it showed the way the various 
political and social actors related to the jihadi organisation and how this had an impact on ISIS 
 
25 The following statement is particularly telling: “prior to the announcement of the Caliphate, residents started 
noticing tensions between more nationalist Iraqi groups and ISIS militants. The Iraqi nationalists and more 
moderate organisations started hanging up banners on city streets, and the more Ba’athist elements started playing 
Saddam-era songs that greatly angered the ISIS fighters, who viewed Saddam Hussein as a secular, anti-Islamic 
force” (Abdulrazaq and Stansfield 2016: 14). 
26 Interview with Mustafa Salim. The relative consensus that ISIS enjoyed in this region can also be explained, 
according to Mustapha, by the fact that this area of the country was historically the place of residence for most of 
the former Baathist security personnel.  
27 Whiteside (2016) interestingly compares the Vietnamese revolutionary guerrilla to ISIS. 
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strategy. This article however also contributed to the enrichment of SMT by looking at the case of 
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